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ABSTRACT   
Several studies including Minea, Tapsoba and Villieu (2012) and Lucotte (2012) claim that in 
emerging countries, the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy and its discipline 
character allow intensifying their efforts to collect tax revenue and/or expenditure rationalization, 
and allows the reduction of their budget deficits (Kadria and Ben Aissa, 2014). But, the lag in the 
effect of monetary policy contains vital information for the policy evaluation (Fang and Miller, 
2011). Hence, our contribution to the previous literature is then to evaluate the time varying 
treatment effect of the IT's adoption by emerging countries on their budgetary discipline in terms 
of reducing or mastering the public deficit. To do this, we used the propensity score matching 
approach in order to take account of this "lag effect" or from this effect throughout time. Our 
empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 41 economies (20 IT and 21 non-IT economies) for 
the period from 1990 to 2010, shows that the lag in effect of IT on public deficit performance 
proves to be shorter and gradual for emerging countries that have adopted this monetary policy 
framework and our conclusions corroborate the literature disciplining effect of IT on fiscal 
policy. 
 
Keywords: Time lag, inflation targeting, public deficit, time varying treatment effect evaluation, 
propensity score matching, emerging countries. 
JEL Classification: C5, E5, E6, H6 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, an extensive literature has focused on further analyzing the 
interactions that may exist between monetary and fiscal policies, in particular thelink between 
public deficit and inflation phenomenon. A mato and Gerlach (2002), Fischer et al. (2002), Vu 
(2004), Catao and Terrones (2005), Wimanda, Turner, and Hall (2011) argue that the high rate of 
inflation, observed especially in many developing countries, is associated with important deficits,  
mainly  financed by seigniorage  revenue. Even  more  interesting, Alesina and Tabellini  (1987),  
Obstfeld (1991), Jensen (1994), Van der Ploeg (1995), Van Arle et al. (1995) and Minea et al. 
(2011) agree on the fact that if the central bank decides to grant significant weight in its loss 
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function to the price stability objective, it will reduce seigniorage revenue  and compel the State 
to increase tax revenues through tax mobilization effort.  Otherwise, valuable theoretical studies 
(see, e.g., Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; Svensson, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999) were motivated 
by the common finding in many empirical studies (see, e.g., Goncalves and Salles, 2008; Lin and 
Ye, 2009), for, the inflation targeting (thereafter IT) policy has helped emerging inflation 
targeters to have a significant improvement in macroeconomic performance which is mainly 
measured through the behavior of inflation, output and interest rates. But, this monetary strategy 
requiresa process of economic and institutional reforms which have a relatively large disciplining 
effect on the conduct of fiscal policy in avoiding seigniorage revenue and therefore opting for a 
tax mobilization/government expenditure rationalisation and public deficit reduction. However, 
developed inflation targeters (thereafter ITers) have become more fiscally disciplined in order to 
reach the target and in the framework of the economic policies coordination3.  
Recently, some empirical studies are focused to verify  this  link  between  the adoption  
of  IT  and  the performance of fiscal policy indicators in emerging and developing countries. 
Indeed, works like Miles (2007), Tapsoba (2010) have sought to test whether the IT policy, as a 
monetary policy framework aimed at stabilize the inflation especially in  emerging countries, 
could act positively on fiscal discipline. In  the  first  time, Minea  and Villieu (2008) and Minea, 
Tapsoba and Villieu (2012) show that IT does produce an incentive for governments to improve 
institutional  quality and  this  monetary strategy  should encourage  the  government to reinforce  
its  tax collection  system  and  rationalize  its  public  expenditures. Lucotte (2012) conducted an 
empirical analysis of 59 countries (40 non-inflation targeters and 19 are targeters) covering the 
1980-2009 period and that using the method of propensity score matching. He concluded that on 
average, the adoption of IT, which involves strengthening the independence of the central bank 
and maintaining a low level of inflation, had a large and significant effect on the effort of tax 
revenue mobilization or collection. In the second time, few empirical works have sought to 
investigate the effect of the adoption of inflation targeting on budgetary discipline in terms of the 
budget deficit performance. Abo-Zaid and Tüzemen (2011), using data from developed and 
developing countries covering the period from 1980-2007, with an econometric specification 
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inspired by Ball and Sheridan (2005) and by adopting the strategy of "Diff in  -Diff",  have come 
to the conclusion  which  showed  that  the  developed  ITers  were  leading a more disciplined 
manner their fiscal  policy  after  the adoption of  IT.  Furthermore, improvements  in budgetary 
imbalances in some developing ITers may be partly due to attempts for achieving  the  inflation  
target. They conclude that these imbalances are significantly improved when countries, 
especially developed, explicitly target  inflation. Thus, the non-ITers will greatly benefit by 
adopting the IT policy. More recently, Kadria and Ben Aissa (2014) tried to examine whether the 
implementation of IT monetary policy and its discipline character allow reducing the budget 
deficit in emerging countries. To do this, they used the propensity score  matching methodology 
to evaluate the treatment effect of IT on fiscal discipline, in terms of budget deficit performance, 
in emerging countries has adopted this monetary policy framework. Their empirical analysis, 
conducted on a sample of 41 economies (20 IT and 21 non-IT economies) for the period from 
1990 to 2010, shows that on average IT adoption has had a considerable and significant effect in 
reducing the budget deficit. The results are confirmed by the robustness tests and corroborate the 
literature of disciplining effects of IT regime on the fiscal policy performance. 
But it must be noted, based on Brun et al. (2008), that the fiscal effort is indirectly 
influenced by  monetary policy. More precisely and to the extent that there exists for many taxes 
a time lag between the date  of taxation and  the date of tax collection by the  state, the real value 
of  tax revenue collected  is  eroded  by  inflation (Keynes-Tanzi-Oliveira effect). When inflation 
reached high levels, this effect constitutes a constraint for the mobilization of fiscal resources. 
The contemporary fiscal policy can be constrained by the monetary policy of previous years. 
Moreover, the lag in effect of monetary policy contains vital information for the policy 
evaluation (Fang and Miller, 2011). Thus, time lags play an important role in evaluating this 
policy and its interaction with the other policies. 
Hence, our contribution to the previous literature is  then to evaluate the time varying 
effect of the IT’s adoption by emerging countries on their budgetary discipline in  terms of 
reducing or mastering the budget deficit, using the dynamic PSM used by Fang and Miller 
(2011)4 to take account of “the lag effect” and the time varying effect of the IT’s adoption on 
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budget deficit performance in emerging countries and to stand out from the existing empirical 
literature while providing additional responses elements of economic policy. 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the data used and a few 
stylized facts. The methodology is described in section 3. Section 4 discusses our econometric 
results. Section 5 concludes, highlighting the main policy implications of our empirical findings. 
2. DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS 
 
We start from a set of annual data, a heterogeneous  sample  of  41  emerging  countries,  
20  are inflation targeters (treatment group) and 21 non-inflation targeters (control group), 
covering the 1990-2010 period. We retain here all emerging countries  that have  pursued an  IT 
regime  inthe  treatment  group.  In  fact,  we  are  based on the sample used in Lin and Ye (2009) 
and we added at targeters Guatemala, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey that have adopted IT 
between 2005 and 2006 and they were considered as non-IT countries (the control group) for 
these authors. Noting that Serbia and Ghana have implemented the IT between 2006 and 2007 
and are not included in the list of inflation targeters in Lin and Ye (2009). In addition, our control 
group was selected relying on the criteria defined by Lin and Ye (2009), based on the level of 
economic development and the size of the country5. Table 1 (see appendix 1) shows the sample 
of countries selected for this study, as well as the respective adoption(s’) dates for the ITers. 
To examine of a preliminary manner whether the adoption of the IT policy has reduced 
the public deficit in the emerging targeters, we identified two key variables namely: the inflation 
rate calculated on the basis of the CPI and the budget deficit (% of GDP) as the state revenue 
(including grants) minus expense, minus net acquisition of non-financial assets. The data were 
obtained through various sources, including, particularly, the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of the World Bank. The other(s) variables so called "conditional" will be presented in the 
third subsection, (but) after the explanation of the methodology of the work, noting that the 
definitions/sources of these variables and the descriptive statistics are in the appendices.  
Figures 1 (a) and (b) provide respectively the average public deficit in emerging ITers 
before and after the adoption of IT well as the time varying of their average budget deficit and 
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Figure 1 (a)                                                                   
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section and in particular, we will try to define the econometric methodology to be 
used in order to empirically test the impact of the 
of fiscal policy in emerging states, in terms of mastery or even budget deficit reduction. More 
specifically, our objective is to evaluate the
deficit in emerging countries that have adopted this monetary policy framework.
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3.1. The time varying treatment effect 
Using propensity score matching7, the intertemporal average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATTt) of every period at and after the adoption year of IT depends on the following 
equation used by Fang and Miller (2011): 
ATTt = 1/Nt * Σ i ∈ T ∩ Sp [PDit – Σ j ∈ C w( Pi, Pj ) PDjt] 
Where PDi and PDj equal the values of the public deficit for countries i in the targeting 
group T and j in the control group C, respectively. Pi and Pj equal the predicted probabilities of 
adopting IT for countries i and j. Nt equals the number of treated units. The match for each 
treated unit i ∈ T ∩ Sp equals a weighted average of the outcomes of non treated countries, Sp is 
the region of common support, and w( Pi, Pj ) equals the weight function.  
In this study, t equals 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, denoting the adopting year8 (t=0) and four years after 
(t=1…4). We are also interested in the final year of our study period, either t = 2010. 
Moreover, the process of estimating the average treatment effect on the treated includes 
four steps referring in particular to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Khander et al. (2010). 
Indeed, the first step consists in estimating the propensity scores9 relying on the conditioning 
variables Xit retained (and) which will be described in the next section. Once the estimated 
propensity scores, we proceed to the determination of the area of the common support densities 
of the two groups of countries propensity scores (targeters and non-inflation targeters) inside 
which will be calculated the ATT, (and) relying on the "Min-Max" technique developed by 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and detailed by Smith and Todd (2005). The third step is to estimate 
the ATT, specifically the average effect of the IT’s adoption on the budget deficit (as a 
percentage of GDP) of economies that have adopted this monetary policy framework. To do this, 
we have chosen to retain three among four propensity score matching methods which there are 
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four types10. First, it refers to the estimator of N nearest neighbor (Nearest-neighbor matching) 
paired with replacement and consists of matching each treated or treatment observation with N 
control units (or the N non- treated observations) having the scores of the nearest propensity (We 
consider N = 1, N = 2 and N = 3). The second method is the Local linear regression matching 
(LLRM) developed by Heckman et al. (1998). Finally, we use the method of Kernel matching 
(Tricube11) which consists to be retained all untreated units (non_ITers) (of retaining all the 
untreated units) belonging to the common support for the construction of the counterfactual; i.e. 
where each observation being weighted untreated so decreasing in function of its distance to the 
considered treated observation. In other words, this method proposed by Heckman et al. (1998) 
allows matching a treatment unit (an ITer) to all control units (non-ITers) proportionally 
weighted in function to their proximity (in terms of propensity scores) to the treated unit. The 
last step is to calculate the standard deviation which allows the assessment of the statistical 
significance of the ATT using the bootstrap technique proposed by Lechner (2002) and detailed 
by Brownstone and Valletta (2001); noting that the retained number of replications is 500.  
3.2. Treatment, result and conditioning variables 
 
3.2.1. Treatment versus outcome variables 
 
In our study, the treatment variable as it was already described above is the IT (ITit). It is 
considered as a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a country led an IT strategy during the 
considered year, and 0 if not. In addition, we have chosen to study the treatment variable 
(IT_FF) for "accomplished" adoption (fully-fledged adoption), counter to the works of Levya 
(2008) and others who have considered two dates corresponding to a "partial" adoption and 
another "accomplished”. These two dates may differ if a country does not meet all the criteria or 
prerequisites characterizing an IT policy. Concerning the outcome variable, we have retained the 
budget deficit (B_DEFICIT) as % of GDP presented in the previous section. 
3.2.2. The conditioning variables 
 
Finally, the departure conditioning variables applied in our study to estimate the 
propensity scores and expected to affect both the outcome indicator and the treatment variable 
are eight in number, thus satisfying the conditional independence hypothesis developed in the 
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methodology section. In fact, four of these variables refer to the institutional and economic 
preconditions theoretically required for the adoption of IT (see, e.g. Batini and Laxton, 2006). 
These variables are the lagged inflation rate of one period (INF_1), the rotation rate of Governors 
at the head of the central bank calculated by sub-periods of five years (TOR_5) as a reverse 
proxy of the monetary authority independence, the degree of de facto flexibility of the exchange 
rate (EXCH) and, the domestic credit for the private sector to GDP ratio (CRED) measuring the 
level of financial development. We expect, on the basis of the literature results, a negative 
correlation between the probability of IT adoption and inflation, the rate of rotation variables, 
while the two other variables are supposed to act positively on this probability. In addition, 
following Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), we consider the degree of trade openness (OPEN) as a 
conditioning variable that reflects the "fear of floating"12, and which is measured by the sum of 
exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. We can therefore theoretically expect a negative 
effect for this variable on the probability of IT adoption. The sixth conditioning variable, 
according to Truman (2003), is the rate of real GDP per capita growth (GDPpc_G). We expect a 
negative effect for this variable on the probability of the IT adoption (Truman, 2003; Samaryna 
and De Haan, 2011), knowing that a high rate of real GDP per capita growth can be considered 
as the result of the macro-economic policies success, which does not necessarily imply an 
alternative framework of IT. The two other conditioning variables that theoretically affect both 
IT_FF and B_DEFICIT variables and whose objective is to satisfy the conditional independence 
assumption, are the total public debt as a percentage of GDP (PUB_DEBT) and the democracy 
indicator of polity IV (POLITY2). We expect that the public debt has a negative effect on the 
probability of IT adoption while the democracy indicator impacts positively this probability. 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Intertemporal estimation of propensity scores  
 
We estimate the propensity scores using a probit model13 and the results of the probit 
estimates with time varying presented in Table 2 (where the considered endogenous variable is 
the accomplished adoption (IT_FF)) shows that apart from the turnover rate of central bank 
governors and the domestic credit, the intertemporal estimated coefficients associated with the 
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other retained conditioning variables such as GDPpc_G, INF_1, EXCH, OPEN, PUB_DEBT and 
POLITY2 are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% especially from the second year of 
adoption and have the expected sign, except for the real GDP per capita growth. This result is 
nonetheless consistent with those found by Lin and Ye (2009). In addition, the explanatory 
power of the model is high, with an average pseudo-R2 of McFadden equal to 75%. 
Table 2: Time varying probit estimates of propensity scores 
Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
***, **, * represent respectively the statistical significance at threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
 
 IT_FF (1)       (t0)            (t1) (t2) (t3)        (t4)              (t2010) 
GDPpc_G    -0.012 0.368*** 0.232** 0.176** 
                     
0.176**      0.176** 
 
   (0.262) (0.170) (0.096) (0.071)     (0.071) (0.071) 
 
    -0.478 -0.353*** -0.244*** -0.247***   INF_1   -0.247***          -0.247*** 
 
   (0.350) (0.159) (0.069) (0.058)     (0.058)          (0.058) 
 
    -5.606     1.252       -0.667 -0.676   TOR_5    -0.676           -0.676 
 
   (6.376) (2.983) (1.622) (1.372)  (1.372)            (1.372) 
 
   1.985* 
                            
0.950***      0.674***     0.588***   EXCH      0.588***           0.588*** 
 
  (1.193) (0.357) (0.178) (0.133) (0.133)            (0.133) 
 
   -0.166 -0.014 -0.002 0.002   CRED      0.002              0.002 
 
  (0.142) (0.023) (.016) (0.012) (0.012)            (0.012) 
 
OPEN 
 
  -0.029 
      
    -0.013 
 
    -0.016** 
 
    -0.015**  
  -0.015**             -0.015** 
 
   (0.026)  (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)             (0.006) 
 
    0.042 
   
-0.010 
 
-0.009 
 
    -0.012*   PUB_DEBT    -0.012*              -0.012* 
 
   (0.041) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)   (0.007)             (0.007) 
      POLITY2                3.927 0.981      0.781***      0.698***    0.698***           0.698*** 
                              (2.976) (0.617) (0.388) (0.270) (0.270)        (0.270) 
                                                                                                           
Nb. of obs.             142 165 192 222 222         222 
Pseudo-R2     0.833 0.772 0.735 0.717 0.717         0.717 
  
4.2. The results of matching 
 
The time varying estimation results for different matching methods (which are shown in 
Table 3) are  generally satisfactory and considerable enough to observe a significant impact of 
the IT adoption on reducing  the budget deficits of economies having implemented this monetary  
policy framework. More precisely, we observe as of the adoption year a significant and (but) low 
impact of IT’s adoption on reducing the budget deficit of these economies. This impact is on the 
order of 0.285 percentage points. But in the years following the adoption, we observe the same 
effect but on a larger scale that stabilizes in the medium term around 1.8% absolute, except for 
the second year after the policy adoption. This result emanating of the treatment  effect  study  in  
dynamic mode seems therefore very interesting. Indeed, the low performance in terms of 
reducing the public deficit in emerging economies during the early years following the adoption 
of IT is due in large part to non full compliance  prerequisites considered as essential to the 
viability of IT, but this situation is changing over time with the strengthening of the economic 
and institutional conditions, it will have a significant effect in reducing the budget deficit. This 
result proves that emerging ITers become more disciplined after the implementation of the IT 
strategy, which has been intensifying their efforts to collect tax revenue and/or expenditure 
rationalization, allowing the reduction of their budget deficits. This corroborates the theoretical 
and empirical literature review that puts in evidence the disciplining effect of the IT on the tax 
policy. 
Table 3: Intertemporal matching estimates of treatment effect on the public deficit (in % of GDP) 
    
                        Algorithms of matching       
  
                    Nearest-neighbor            
matching     LLRM 
Kernel 
matching 
  
           N=1 N=2 N=3 (Tricube) (Tricube) 
  
          
  
    IT_FF     
 (2) ATTo                          -0.285** -0.658 -1.166 - -0.337 
  
                         (0.134) (1.075) (2.450) (-) (1.709) 
(3) ATT1           -2.713 -2.991** -2.50** -2.394** -3.647** 
  
            (1.686) (1.297) (1.260) (1.025) (1.782) 
(4) ATT2             -1.579 -1.620 -1.375 -1.365 -1.475 
  
           (1.144) (1.131) (1.008) (1.003) (1.337) 
(5) ATT3             -1.878** -1.647** -1.623*** -1.565** -1.886* 
  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper, we tried to study the dynamic interaction that may exist between the 
adoption of IT and the conduct of fiscal policy, in terms of the public deficit performance, in the 
case of emerging economies. Taking inspiration from previous works having studied the 
disciplining effect of the IT on tax policy performance and using the propensity score matching 
approach, we could evaluate the time varying treatment effect (the adoption of IT) on the budget 
deficit of ITers. Our estimation results show a low performance in terms of reducing the public 
deficit in emerging countries during the early years following the adoption of IT but (that) this 
situation is changing over time with the strengthening of the institutional and economic 
conditions, it will have a significant effect on reducing the budget deficit. This impact is on 
average in the order of 1.8% percentage points. In sum, the lag in effect of IT on public deficit 
performance proves shorter for emerging countries having adopted this monetary policy 
framework. Therefore, we can say that the emerging government can benefit ex-post and 
gradually from a decline in their public deficits and our conclusions corroborate the literature 
disciplining effect of IT on fiscal policy. 
The policy implication(s) can manifest at this point. The adoption of IT renders 
monetary authorities more independent vis-à-vis the public authorities and does produce an 
incentive for governments to improve institutional quality, prompting these to reform their tax 
systems and therefore to perform their budget deficits.  
 
 
 
 
  
            (0.886) (0.843) (0.558) (0.665) (1.060) 
 
(6) ATT4                -1.878*** -1.647** -1.623** -1.565** -1.886 
             (0.730) (0.794) (0.739) (0.708) (1.189) 
     
    (7) ATT2010              -1.878*** -1.647** -1.623** -1.565** -1.886** 
    
             (0.680) (0.708) (0.781) (0.666) (0.825) 
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors on the basis of 500 replications are in parentheses. 
***, **, * represent respectively the statistical significance at threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1/ Table 1: List of the sample countries with dates of inflation targeting adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Source: Lin and Ye (2009) and Internet sites of central banks.  
                   Note that Slovakia abandoned the IT in 2009 and joined the euro area. 
 
Appendix 2: Variables definitions and sources 
Variables Definitions Sources 
IT_FF Fully-fledged adoption of inflation targeting. Levya (2008) 
B_DEFICIT Budget deficit as % of GDP. WDI (2012) 
GDPpc_G Real GDP per capita growth. WDI (2012) 
INF_1 
One-year lagged inflation rate (as annual change of the 
CPI). WDI (2012) 
TOR_5 
Turnover rate of central bank governors based on 5-year 
averages (De facto central bank independence indicator). 
Dreher et al. (2008) ; Lucotte 
(2012) 
EXCH 
De facto flexibility indicator of exchange rate, comprised 
between 1 and 14 from the least to more flexible exchange 
rate regime. 
IMF’s AREAR; Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) 
CRED Domestic credit to private sector ratio in % of GDP. WDI (2012) 
OPEN 
Trade openness (as the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services as a share of GDP). WDI (2012) 
PUB_DEBT Total public debt as a share of GDP. Abbas et al. (2010) 
POLITY2 
Indicator of democracy taking values from -10 (very 
autocratic) to +10 (very democratic). Polity IV Project 
 
 
 
IT countries Full-Fledged 
adoption 
Non-IT Countries 
Brazil 1999 Algeria                          
Chile 2000 Angola   
Colombia 2000 Argentina   
Czech Republic 1998 Bulgaria   
Ghana 2007 China   
Guatemala 2005 Côte d'Ivoire   
Hungary 2001 Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
  
Indonesia 2005 El Salvador   
Israel 1997 Ecuador   
Mexico 2001 India   
Peru 2002 Malaysia   
Philippines 2002 Morocco   
Poland 1999 Nigeria   
Romania 2005 Pakistan   
Serbia 2006 Russia 
Slovakia 2005 Senegal   
South Africa  2000 Singapore   
South Korea  1998 Tunisia   
Thailand 2000 Uruguay   
Turkey 2006 Venezuela   
  
Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables      Obs.     Mean  Std. Dev.       Min     Max 
  
                                      (1990-2010)     
GDPpc_G       820              2.366194         4.816255         -37.08575        17.76985 
INF_1       782              56.17121         370.8253         -1.753557        7481.664 
TOR_5       800                  .22375         .2091426                0                     1 
EXCH       535              8.770093         3.897738                1                    15 
CRED       791              39.72655           30.9886                0                165.7191 
OPEN       799              73.38848         49.47239          13.75305         438.0917 
PUB_DEBT       762                55.0335         32.97057          1.026661         289.5542 
POLITY2       837              4.574671         5.479909               -8                    10 
Source :Authors’calculations   
 
 
 
 
